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[Vol. 74 jecting his claim that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
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The governor of South Dakota denied Helm's request to commute his sentence to a fixed term of years. 13 Helm then sought habeas corpus relief.1 4 The district court denied relief but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the life sentence without parole was unconstitutionally disproportionate to the offense and directing the district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus unless the state resentenced Helm within sixty days.' 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the eighth amendment question.
III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS IN HELM
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and held that Helm's sentence violated the eighth amendment.
1 7 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell concluded that the eighth amendment forbids sentences of imprisonment that are disproportionate to the offense.' 8 The Court found that " [t] he principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the crime"' 9 had been explicitly recognized by the Court in Weems v. United States ,20 Robinson v. California , 21 and Enmund v. Florida,22 and was part of English law and the American Bill of Rights. 23 Acknowledging its previous statement that 12 State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497 (S.D. 1980) . 13 103 S. Ct. at 3006.
14 Helm sought habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1976) . 15 Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 1982) , afd, 103 S. Ct. 3001 (1983) . The court of appeals recommended that a presentence investigation be conducted before Helm was resentenced. Id. at 587 n.17. 16 103 S. Ct. 339 (1982) . 17 103 S. Ct. 3001, 3016 (1983) . 18 Id. at 3009. The eighth amendment imposes several limitations on the government's power to punish. The eighth amendment prohibits modes of punishment that are inherently cruel. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) ; cf. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (electrocution not impermissibly cruel method of execution); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878) (death by firing squad not impermissibly cruel method of execution). It prohibits punishing someone for a noncriminal status. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (imprisonment for being a heroin addict unconstitutional). But see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (alcoholic can be punished for being drunk in public). In addition the eighth amendment prohibits excessive punishment. Enmund v. Florida, 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982) ; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). Punishment is excessive when it either "(1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment. . . or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. Helm challenged his sentence on the ground that it was disproportionate to his crime, and thus excessive punishment.
19 103 S. Ct. at 3006. 20 217 U.S. 349 (1910) . 21 370 U. S. 660 (1962) . 22 102 S. Ct. 3368 (1982) . In determining whether Helm's sentence was proportionate, the Court considered the following "objective" 26 factors: "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. ' 378, 378-82 (1980) . 24 103 S. Ct. at 3009 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) The Court distinguished its recent holding in Rummel v. Estelle, 3 9 that a sentence of life imprisonment with parole for three minor felonies did not violate the eighth amendment, by pointing to the difference between parole and commutation. Parole is a "regular part of the rehabilitative process" and is "the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases,"4 while commutation is an "ad hoc exercise of executive clemency" which may occur "at any time for any reason without reference to any standards. 44 and was treated more harshly than criminals convicted of similar crimes, the Court concluded that Helm's 32 Such crimes include murder (where it is the offender's first conviction), treason, and first degree manslaughter (where the offender has one or two prior felony convictions). Id.
33 Such crimes include first degree manslaughter (where it is the offender's first conviction), attempted murder, and first degree rape (where the offender has only one or two prior felony convictions). Id.
34 Such crimes include attempted murder (where it is the offender's first conviction), first degree rape, and heroin dealing. Id. In dissent, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, argued that Rummel was correctly decided and should determine the result in this case. The dissent wrote that Rummel rejected eighth amendment proportionality review of sentences of imprisonment. 46 According to the dissent, the proportionality analysis
should not be applied to sentences of imprisonment for two reasons. First, the length of imprisonment is solely a matter df legislative prerogative. Second, there is no bright line separating one sentence of imprisonment from another, or indicating the appropriate length of imprisonment for a particular crime. 4 7 The dissent noted that each of the three factors considered by the majority in declaring Helm's sentence disproportionate 48 had been categorically rejected by the Rummel Court because they were subjective and violated principles of federalism. 49 The dissent denied that Helm's ineligibility for parole distinguished his case from Rummel's. 50 Finally, the dissent argued that because the majority failed to stipulate the prison sentences to which the proportionality analysis would be applied, the majority's decision would result in appellate review of all sentences of imprisonment. 5 '
IV. ANALYSIS
In Solem v. Helm, the Court held for the first time that, under the eighth amendment, prison sentences, at least those for life without parole, must be proportionate to the crime. 52 Three years before, however, 324-25 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). It is not at all clear, however, that such was the case. In Weems, the defendant, a Philippine official, was convicted of falsifying a public document and sentenced to fifteen years in cadena temporal. (Cadena temporal was imprisonment at hard and painful labor followed by perpetual surveillance and loss of civil rights.) The Court declared the punishment cruel and unusual in both mode and extent, stating: "[The punishment] is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. It is unusual in its character. Its punishments come under the condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account of their degree and kind." 217 U.S. at 377. The decision thus seems to have been based on the Court's holding that the mode of punishment was cruel and unusual. Support for a proportionality holding in Weems has been taken from the Court's isolated statement that "[s]uch penalties for such offenses amaze those in Rummel v. Estelle ,5 the Court declined to hold that a life sentence with parole was disproportionate. The Court in Helm distinguished Rummel on the basis that Helm had no possibility of parole. This Note will show that this distinction is inconsistent with the Court's prior treatment of parole and commutation, and that the exercise of judicial sentencing discretion in Helm and its absence in Rummel better explains the different results reached in these two cases. This Note will also show that the proportionality analysis used by the Helm majority is different from the proportionality test used by the Court in capital cases. The Helm decision thus leaves the relationships between the proportionality test used in capital cases and that used in non-capital cases unclear.
A. THE COURT'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN RUMMEL AND HELM
The Court recently rejected a proportionality challenge to a noncapital sentence in Rummel v. Estelle. 5 4 Rummel was convicted of three felonies involving the fraudulent obtainment of money; the total amount obtained was $230. 55 The prosecutor charged Rummel under Texas's recidivist statute, 5 6 which imposed a mandatory life sentence upon conviction of a third felony. The Court, in a five-four decision, 57 rejected Rummel's habeas corpus claim that his life sentence was disproportionate punishment and thus cruel and unusual.
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In Rummel, the Court did not clearly reject proportionality analysis for non-capital cases but indicated that it would rarely, if ever, find a sentence of imprisonment disproportionate. Reviewing its past cases, the Court stated:
Given the unique nature of the punishments considered in Weems and in the death penalty cases, one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies ... the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.
59
Weems and the capital punishment cases were declared of little relevance because of the unique nature of the punishments involved: "Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent. the imposition of capital punishment. . . this Court could draw a "bright line" between the punishment of death and the various other permutations and commutations of punishments short of that ultimate sanction .... [Tihis line was considerably clearer than would be any constitutional distinction between one term of years and a shorter or longer term of years.
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The Court in Rummel examined factors suggested by the defendant for judging the proportionality of the sentence but found that, because of considerations of federalism and the complications of parole and recidivist punishment, these factors did not justify a finding of disproportionality. These factors, later adopted by the majority in Helm,61 were: the severity of the crime and of the punishment; sentences for other crimes in the same jurisdiction (intrajurisdictional comparison); and sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions (interjurisdictional comparison). The Court found violence and the value of property to be unsatisfactory criteria for judging the severity of a crime. 62 The Court accepted segregation of recidivists from society as a goal of punishment and stated that "the point at which a recidivist will be deemed to have demonstrated the necessary propensities and the amount of time that the recidivist will be isolated from society are matters largely within the discretion of the punishing jurisdiction. ' 63 The intrajurisdictional comparison, complicated by Rummel's recidivism, was "inherently specula- (1974) . The factors considered under this test were: the nature and gravity of the offense; the legislative purpose of the punishment; punishment of the crime in other jurisdictions; and punishment of other crimes in the same jurisdiction. Id. at 140-43. In Hutto, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Rummel, rejected each of the four factors, and indicated that Rummel had implicitly rejected the factors considered in Hart. 454 U.S. at 373-74 & n.2. The Supreme Court chided the court of appeals for failing to follow Rummel:
Rummel stands for the proposition that federal courts should be "reluctan[t] to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment" . . . and that "successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences" should be "exceedingly rare". . . . By affirming the District Court decision after our decision in Rummel, the Court of Appeals sanctioned an intrusion into the basic line-drawing process that is "properly within the province of legislatures, not courts." Id. at 374 (quoting Rummel, 454 U.S. at 272, 274, 275-76).
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented, viewing the opinion as an improper
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The Helm Court distinguished Rummel on the basis that parole was available to Rummel and not to Helm. 6 7 It appears that the main reason the Court thought this distinction to be important was its belief that a life sentence without parole, unlike a sentence of life with parole, is similar to capital punishment. 68 In Rummel, the Court found the death penalty cases, in which the proportionality analysis had been applied, to be of limited relevance because there was no bright line between one sentence of imprisonment and another as there was between death and other punishments. 69 The Helm Court felt that life imprisonment without parole was, like capital punishment, qualitatively different from a sentence for a term of years because the only hope of release is commutation. 70 The Helm Court seemed to suggest that a prisoner sentenced to life with parole legitimately has a greater expectation of release than does a prisoner sentenced to death or to life without parole. In other words, the Court suggested that the possibility of receiving parole is much greater than is the possibility of commutation, which, according to the Court, is granted "'ad hoe" and "without reference to any standards."
The Court's distinction between life with parole and life without parole is formalistic and inconsistent with the Court's recent treatment of parole and commutation. While the Court has recently emphasized the difference between parole and commutation, 72 the Court has also held that, in the absence of a statutorily granted expectation, there is no constitutionally protected right to parole. 73 Moreover, the Court has not always characterized clemency as standardless. Members of the Court have assumed that clemency will be exercised in a principled expansion of Rummel and as an abdication of the Court's responsibility to enforce the eighth amendment. The dissent read Rummel as approving the application of a proportionality analysis to non-capital sentences: "Rummel rests on the understanding that, as a consequence of the overwhelming state interests in deterring habitual offenders, manner and will not be standardless or arbitrary. 74 The Court has held that capital sentencing juries may consider the fact that life sentences can be commuted, rejecting arguments that such consideration injected a speculative element into the sentencing process.
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The Court's belief that life without parole is similar to capital punishment is not consistent with the Court's rationale for treating capital punishment differently from other punishments. The Court has reasoned that there is greater need for reliability in capital sentencing because the punishment is final and irrevocable. If the defendant is wrongfully convicted, there is no possibility of relief after execution.
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Life sentences with parole and without parole are both unlike death sentences in this respect, 77 and thus the absence of parole does not justify the application of a capital punishment analysis to a life sentence. Therefore, the distinction between Helm and Rummel based on the possibility of parole, while expedient, seems unprincipled.
The different results in Rummel and Helm are more likely to have been caused by the role judicial sentencing discretion played in Helm. Rummel was sentenced pursuant to a statute providing that a habitual offender receive a mandatory life sentence. 78 Helm was sentenced pursuant to a statute authorizing a maximum enhanced sentence of life imprisonment but providing for no minimum sentence. 79 Presumably, the trial judge could have given Helm any sentence up to life imprisonment.
The judicial discretion involved in Helm undermines the Rummel Court's primary reason for rejecting Rummel's proportionality challenge. In Rummel, the Court emphasized that deciding the appropriate punishment for a crime was a matter of legislative prerogative and that courts could not perform this function. 80 The Court refused to substitute its own judgment for that of the Texas legislature. The legislature had the authority to judge the state's interest in confining repeat offenders, and the recidivist statute was "nothing more than a societal decision that when such a person as the defendant commits yet another felony, he should be subjected to the admittedly serious penalty of incarceration for life .... ,8 1 Because the South Dakota legislature made the more 74 California v. Ramos, 103 S. Ct. 3446, 3465 (1983) Viewing the Helm decision in this way suggests that the Court may begin to review the sentencing discretion exercised in non-capital cases. Generally, a sentence within statutory limits is not subject to judicial review.
8 4 The Court has reviewed judicial sentencing discretion only in death penalty cases. 85 The Court's invalidation of the discretionary sentence imposed in Helm may indicate that in the future the Court will review the exercise of discretion in non-capital cases. If such is the case, the Court will not only be following the course it has adopted in death penalty cases; it will also be following the current trend favoring a curtailment of judicial sentencing discretion.
8 6 82 103 S. Ct. at 3014 n.26. One commentator has noted that when the legislature delegates to the judiciary the authority to choose from a wide range of sentences, it is reasonable to believe that the legislature has assumed that the judiciary will impose sentences proportionate to the crimes. Note, Disproportionality in Sentences of Imprisomnent, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1119 REV. , 1160 REV. , 1165 REV. (1979 S. 386, 393 (1958) ; see Note, Constitutional Lau-Eighth Amendment-Appellate Sentence Review, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 655, 660 nn.34-35 . One possible exception to this general rule is where the sentence imposed may be due to judicial vindictiveness. In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969) , the Court held that imposition of a more severe sentence upon retrial by the same judge could raise a presumption of judicial vindictiveness and that, to rebut this presumption, the reasons for imposition of a more severe sentence after retrial had to appear in the record and had to be based on the defendant's conduct following the original sentence.
85 Only in capital cases has sentence individualization (that is, tailoring the sentence to the circumstances of the offense and the characteristics of the offender) been held to be constitutionally required. Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 Ct. , 2743 Ct. -44 (1983 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court has also required that capital sentencing discretion be limited and channeled, so that a death sentence is not imposed in an arbitrary manner. E.g., Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. Ct. 2733 Ct. (1983 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) Punishment, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 799 (1981) . Recent interest in curtailing sentencing discretion appears to be due, at least in part, to the resurgence of the "just deserts" or retribution theory of punishment and the decline of rehabilitation as a justification for punishments. See R. The proportionality test used in Helm was different from the proportionality test the Court has applied in death penalty cases such as Coker v. Georgia 8 7 and Enmund v. Florida.88 In Coker, a plurality of the Court held that death was a disproportionate and thus excessive penalty for the rape of an adult woman. 8 9 The plurality's proportionality analysis consisted of two steps. First, the Court examined objective evidence to determine whether imposing the death penalty for the crime of rape was acceptable to contemporary society. The objective evidence examined included: whether other states imposed the death penalty for rape; 9 g whether juries had given the death sentence to rapists; 91 and whether more serious crimes had less severe maximum penalties. 9 2 Second, the plurality applied its own judgment to determine whether the crime was serious enough to warrant the harshest penalty society imposes. 93 The Court indicated that its subjective judgment, not the objective evidence, was the decisive factor in determining proportionality. The Court next decided, in Enmund, that death was an unconstitutionally disproportionate penalty for an aider and abettor in a murder who did not take or attempt or intend to take life. 95 The Court used the analysis developed in Coker, 9 6 again emphasizing that whether the penalty was proportionate to the crime depended on the Court's own SUPREME COURT REVIEW judgment.
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In Helm, the Court did not apply the same test, although it drew support from Coker and Enmund in formulating the test. The Helm Court examined the same factors as those considered in Coker and Enmund. Public opinion was determined through interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional comparisons. In considering the gravity of the offense, the harm caused and the moral culpability of the offender were discussed, 98 as they were in Coker and Enmund. 99 In Helm, however, the Court emphasized that all the factors were objective and that no one factor was determinative, 1 0 0 while in Coker and Enmund the Court stated that its subjective determination of the severity of the offense and the harshness of the punishment was decisive.
10 ' The Court in Helm cited Coker and Enmund as the source of the factors1 0 2 but did not assert that it was applying the same proportionality test it had applied in those death penalty cases.
It is likely that the Court in Helm referred to the "severity of the crime versus the harshness of the penalty" factor as an "objective" one in order to be consistent with Rummel, where even the "objective" factors involved in determining public opinion were dismissed as inherently speculative or violative of federalism concerns. 1 0 3 Whether the "severity-harshness" factor is called subjective or objective may be immaterial; determination of the severity of a crime is inherently the most subjective of the factors considered. 1 0 4 It seems clear that, at least in non-capital cases, no one factor is determinative. Whether the same is now true for capital cases as well is not clear. Since Rummel emphasized the distinction between capital and non-capital proportionality review, and the Court in Helm was careful not to overrule Rummel, it seems unlikely that the Court intended to change the proportionality test used in capital cases. However, the Helm Court's distinction between Helm and Rummel on the basis of parole allows Helm to be interpreted as applying a proportionality test only because a life sentence without parole is analogous 97 The Court stated: to death.
10 5 If Helm is read in this way, the Court may apply the Helm formulation of the proportionality test in future capital cases.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The Helm decision makes it clear that life sentences without parole imposed in a judge's discretion may be found disproportionate. Mandatory sentences are unlikely to be found disproportionate because of the unacceptable impact such a result would have on legislative discretion to decide the appropriate punishment for a crime. Because the Court is reluctant to compare the severity of imprisonment for different numbers of years, 0 6 sentences for terms of years are unlikely to be found disproportionate unless the sentencing process changes to include structures, such as guidelines, sentencing councils, and required articulation of reasons for sentences, for narrowing sentencing discretion.
One issue that will be pressed in future proportionality challenges is the likelihood of parole and commutation under different state systems. 0 7 The Helm Court emphasized South Dakota's low rate of commutation, while the Rummel Court emphasized the high probability of parole in Texas. 0 8
The new flood of cases challenging sentences on the basis of proportionality predicted by the Helm dissent 10 9 is unlikely to appear. 1o In the years before Rummel, state and lower federal courts rejected many proportionality challenges and found only a few sentences disproportionate. I ' Challenges did not cease after Rummel"1 2 and are unlikely to
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[o7 become unmanageable after Helm. In any case, states are free to adopt interpretations of the cruel and unusual punishment clauses of their own state constitutions that are more favorable to defendants, 113 and some state constitutions include explicit proportionality clauses.' 1 4
VI. CONCLUSION
In So/em v. Helm, the Court clearly held for the first time that a sentence of imprisonment could be cruel and unusual because it is disproportionate to the crime committed. Helm clarified the confusion left after Rummel v. Estelle over whether a non-capital sentence could be held disproportionate. Because of the Court's careful and formalistic distinguishing of Rummel, however, the decision could be read in the future to allow proportionality analysis for life sentences without parole solely because of their similarity to death sentences. Such an interpretation would limit the application of proportionality analysis to life sentences without parole and could lead to confusion concerning the use of the proportionality test in capital cases. The better and more principled interpretation of Helm is that it is based on a review of judicial sentencing discretion. Under this reading, Helm modified the proportionality test used in capital cases for use in non-capital cases. The modified test pays more deference to legislative determinations and places less emphasis on the Court's own judgment.
